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Judicial Review of
Land Bank Dispositions
Present mechanisms intended to control land use in the United
States have been sharply criticized.' Traditional regulatory devices have
in many ways failed to control development, produce an economic use
of resources, or provide adequate facilities for a growing metropolitan
population. 2 A variety of alternative methods of land use control have
been proposed.3 One such alternative, public land banking, has been
noted with considerable interest and approval. 4 Land banking gives
the government more direct control over land use patterns than other
schemes; large tracts of land are acquired by the government and later
disposed of in parcels according to a plan for regional development.
Conflicts over the disposition of banked land are inevitable, and proper
resolution of such conflicts is essential to the effectiveness of the sys-
tem. Courts are the final arbiters of conflicts in many similar situations5
and are in a good position to provide effective review of land bank dis-
positions.
This comment examines judicial review of land bank disposition de-
cisions and suggests judicial techniques to curb the two major prob-
lems in disposition--dispositions that are inconsistent with land bank
1 TIME, Oct. 1, 1973, at 94-99; see MODEL LAND DEVELOPMENT CODE xxi-xxviii (rent.
Draft No. 1, 1968). See also notes 2-3 infra.
2 AMERICAN SOC'Y OF PLANNING OFFICIALS, PROBLEMS OF ZONING AND LAND-USE REG-
uLATioN (National Comm'n on Urban Problems Research Report No. 2, 1968); Comment,
Public Land Banking: A New Praxis for Urban Growth, 23 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 897,
903-06 (1972) [hereinafter cited as Public Land Banking]; Note, Land Use Control in
Metropolitan Areas: The Failure of Zoning and a Proposed Alternative, 45 S. CAL. L. REV.
335, 338-50 (1972).
3 The most comprehensive reform proposal has been offered by the American Law
Institute. MODEL LAND DEVELOPMENT CODE (rent. Draft No. 1, 1968); (Tent. Draft No. 2,
1970); (rent. Draft No. 3, 1971); (rent. Draft No. 4, 1972); (rent. Draft No. 5, 1973) [here-
inafter cited as Tent. Draft No. 1, 2, 3, 4, or 5].
While this comment deals with a system of greater public control of land use, some
commentators have suggested a more privatized system of land use regulation. See, e.g.,
B. SIEGAN, LAND USE WrrHour ZONING (1972); Davis, Economic Elements in Municipal
Zoning Decisions, 39 LAND ECON. 375 (1963); Ellickson, Alternatives to Zoning: Covenants,
Nuisance Rules, and Fines as Land Use Controls, 40 U. CHI. L. REv. 681 (1973); Note, An
Economic Analysis of Land Use Conflicts, 21 STAN. L. REv. 293 (1969).
4 See text and notes at notes 21-27 infra.
5 See, e.g., Norwalk CORE v. Norwalk Redevelopment Agency, 395 F.2d 920 (2d Cir.
1968) (urban renewal); Hoffnan v. City of Stillwater, 461 P.2d 944 (Okla. 1969) (zoning).
See generally L. JAFFE, JUDICIAL CONTROL OF ADMINISTRATIVE A-HON 320-27 (1965).
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goals as defined by statute and dispositions that exclude certain uses
or groups from an area in conflict with general state policies. In juris-
dictions that have already authorized land banking," effective judicial
review is necessary for achieving the statutory goals and controlling
abuse. Where land banking programs are being considered,7 the effec-
tiveness of judicial review is an important factor in determining both
the desirability of land banking and the form of a land bank system.
I. PUBLIC LAND BANKING
A. Background and Current Proposals
In a public land banking system8 a governmental entity, which can
be an agency of the state, county, or metropolitan government or an in-
dependent public corporation, 9 is endowed with authority to acquire,
hold, develop, and dispose of land. The entity uses this authority to
exercise direct control over the development of the region and indirect
control over the development of nearby regions.'0 In the first phase of
the process, the land bank predicts in general terms the probable and
desirable growth patterns of the region. Next, appropriate tracts of
land, usually undeveloped, are acquired by purchase, transfer from
other government agencies, or eminent domain. This land is then held
in reserve, or "banked," until the development situation is ripe for its
release. During the holding period it may be plotted and subdivided,
and streets, sewers, and other public improvements may be constructed.
Finally, the land is transferred under deeds or leases that contain con-
ditions designed to assure that the land use conforms to the development
objectives."
6 ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 67V, § 807.12 (1971); Ky. Acts ch. 125 (1972); LA. REv. STAT. ANN.
tit. 33, ch. 21 (Supp. 1973); N.Y. UNCONSOL. LAws §§ 6251-85 (McKinney Supp. 1973); OHmO
REv. CODE ANN. ch. 349 (Page Supp. 1972); P.R. LAws ANN. tit. 23, ch. 24 (1964).
7 For example, land banking is being considered for a proposed massive redevelopment
of Chicago's South Loop area. Interview with Robert Merriam, Urban Investment and
Development Company, in Chicago, Illinois, Feb. 18, 1974.
8 See Tent. Draft No. 5, supra note 3, at 50. While "land banking" can also refer to
advance land assembly by private developers, or by government for specific purposes, the
term will be used in this comment as defined in the text.
9 M. CLAWSON, SUBURBAN LAND CONVERSION IN THE UNITED STATES: AN ECONOMIC AND
GOVERNMENTAL PROCESS 362-63 (1971); Public Land Banking, supra note 2, at 938-44.
Compare P.R. LAws ANN. § 311 (1964) with OHIo REv. CODE ANN. § 849.03 (Page Supp.
1972).
10 The nature of the land bank's direct control of development through purchase and
sale of land is obvious. The land bank also achieves indirect control over the development
of land not publicly owned. The policies as to time and price of dispositions have a power-
ful impact on the regional land market. Uses that are limited in the land bank area are
drawn to surrounding areas. Conversely, factors that attract uses to banked land make
other locations less desirable.
11 Bain, The Organization of Growth, in NATIONAL COMM. ON URBAN GROWTH POLICY,
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Land banking is intended to achieve three general goals. The first
is control of urban development patterns.12 Control over time, loca-
tion, and type of development allows the land bank to create an effec-
tive sequence and arrangement of uses on a local and regional basis.
A second goal, related to the determination of land uses, is assurance
of an adequate level of all land uses needed in an area.13 For example,
the land bank can provide for an adequate supply of low and middle
income housing.1 4 Finally, land banking can benefit public finances in
two ways: centralized control over timing and installation of public
services results in economies of scale,'" and governmental ownership
and resale permits capture of the appreciation in land value caused by
government action in aid of growth.'(
Land bank enabling legislation and development plans define these
goals more precisely and establish priorities among goals. The statute
sets forth the policies that the land bank is to pursue,17 and the develop-
ment plan applies the legislative intent to specific areas by establishing
policies on land acquisition and disposition, future uses, and timing.18
Land banking has been used in some American urban areas,19
THE NEw CrrY 135, 140-42 (D. Canty ed. 1969). See also Public Land Banking, supra note
2, at 944, 962-74; Reps, The Future of American Planning: Requiem or Renascence?, 1
LAND-USE CONTaoLs No. 2, at 3-8 (1967). The development objectives may of course in-
dude open spaces or other public uses.
12 NATIONAL COMM'N ON URBAN PROBLEMS, BUILDING THE AMERICAN CrrT 251 (1968);
D. SHOUP & R. MACK, AnvANCE LAN AcQuIsMON BY LOCAL GOVERMENTs 100-02 (1968);
Tent. Draft No. 5, supra note 3, at 51; Reps, supra note 11, at 4.
1s Finley, A Fresh Start, in NATIONAL COMM'N ON URBAN GRowTH POLICY, supra note 11,
at 169; D. SHOUP & R. MACK, supra note 12, at 101-02; Reps, supra note 11, at 4-5.
14 This may be done either directly or indirectly through stabilization of the market
in raw land and elimination of the speculative profits that discourage construction of
low and middle income housing. See Public Land Banking, supra note 2, at 935-38.
15 D. SHOUP' & R. MACK, supra note 12, at 100-01; Tent. Draft No. 5, supra note 3, at
51; Public Land Banking, supra note 2, at 929.
16 NATIONAL COMM'N ON URBAN PROBLEMS, supra note 12, at 251; D. SHOUP & R. MACK,
supra note 12, at 100; Public Land Banking, supra note 2, at 930-31.
17 E.g., ILL. RIv. STAT. ch. 67V, § 303 (1971); LA. REv. STAT. ANN. § 33:7602 (Supp. 1973);
N.Y. UNCONSOL. LAWS § 6252 (McKinney Supp. 1973).
38 E.g., LA. REv. STAT. ANN. § 33:7603(15) (Supp. 1973). A mature planning process will
not involve only a single effort to create a written plan followed by dispositions to imple-
ment the plan. Planning and operating functions will be continuous and inseparable, and
land uses may not be spedfically located until late in the planning process. It is useful,
however, to conceptualize two stages, separating the planning function from the disposal
function. See generally Montgomery, Improving the Design Process in Urban Renewal, 31
J. Am. INsT. OF PLANNERs 7 (1965).
19 The most famous American urban public land project is Washington, D.C. Land
was taken by the government from owners who wanted to hold it for speculative profit.
A public agency held the land, planned the entire city, sold parcels for development
according to a master plan, and retained large areas for public uses. Reps, supra note
11, at 9-10. Other dties used land banking from the colonial period through the Civil War.
Id. In more recent times the New Deal Resettlement Administration attempted a na-
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and its effectiveness has been demonstrated in foreign nations.20 Re-
form proposals based on land banking have become more urgent and
widespread as the problems caused by inadequate regulation of land
use have become more acute. The intense debate of the 1930s and
1940s over public ownership and control of land2' has been revived
with considerable intensity. Commentators and commissions have urged
that governments employ public acquisition and disposition of land to
control and channel urban development.22 Citizen groups have pre-
sented proposals for public land banks in individual cities and states. 23
Several state legislatures have responded with enabling legislation for
land reserve agencies. 24 Congress, in the Urban Growth and New Com-
munity Development Act of 1970,2, sought to remove financial barriers
that had prevented many areas from adopting land banking. Poten-
tially the most influential proposal is presented in the Model Land De-
velopment Code of the American Law Institute.26 The Reporters' Draft
includes, as part of a comprehensive scheme for reform of government
tional program to create greenbelt cities with some success. D. SHOUP & R. MACK, supra
note 12, at 103. Puerto Rico presently has the most extensive American land reserve policy.
Public Land Banking, supra note 2, at 916-23.
20 Stockholm, for example, has used land banking throughout this century to create a
pattern of new towns in the metropolitan area. Today 36 percent of the land in Stockholm
and 83 percent of the surrounding land is publicly held. G. EDWARS, LAND, PEOPLE AND
POLICY 58 (1969). Other European nations and Canada are engaged in massive land bank-
ing programs. Id. at 47-76; K. PARSONS & H. BUDKE, CANADIAN LAND BANKS (ASPO Plan-
ning Advisory Service No. 284, 1972); Public Land Banking, supra note 2, at 908-12.
21 This debate is reviewed in Tent. Draft No. 5, supra note 3, at 51. See also Comment,
Public Land Ownership, 52 YALE L.J. 634 (1943).
22 ADVISORY COMM'N ON INTERGOVERNMENTAL RELATIONS, URBAN AND RuRiAL AMERICA:
POLICIES FOR FUTuRE GROWTH 161 (1968); M. CLAWSON, supra note 9, at 355-56; NATIONAL
COMM'N ON URBAN PROBLEMS, supra note 12, at 251; NATIONAL COMM. ON URBAN GROWTH
POLICY, supra note 11, at 172-74; Haar, Wanted: Two Federal Levers for Urban Land
Use-Land Banks and Urbank, in PAPERS SuBMrrIED TO THE SUBCoMM. ON HOUsING PANELS,
HOUSE BANKING AND CURRENCY COMM. 92d Cong., 1st Sess. 927 (1971); Reps, supra note 11,
at 2-3, and sources cited in Appendix.
23 AMERICAN SOC'Y OF PLANNING OFFICIALS, NEW DIRECTIONS IN CONNECTICUT PLANNING
LEGISLATION (1967); BALTIMORE REGIONAL PLANNING COUNCIL, A PLAN FOR THE METRO-
POLITAN BALTIMORE REGION (1970).
24 See note 6 supra.
25 42 U.S.C. §§ 4501-32 (1970). Under the Act, any public agency with authority to de-
velop new community projects may receive 100 percent of the value of real property ac-
quired and the costs of development in federal loans, up to a maximum of $50 million
per project. Some state statutes are specifically designed to take advantage of federal funds.
E.g., OHIO REv. CODE ANN. § 349.03 C (Page Supp. 1973).
26 MODEL LAND DEVELOPMENT CODE art. 6 (Unpublished Reporters' Draft, 1973) [herein-
after cited as Reporters' Draft.] The Proposed Final Draft of the Code is now in prepara-
tion. The Reporters' Draft represents the unofficial and tentative thoughts of the Reporters
and was provided through the courtesy of Professor Allison Dunham, the Code's Chief
Reporter. Citations to the Reporters' Draft should not be attributed to the American Law
Institute.
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regulation of land development, a model article for the establishment of
state land reserve agencies that are authorized to engage in the full
range of land bank activities. 27
B. The Need for Judicial Review of Land Bank Dispositions
Disposition is the stage at which planning is most crucial, where land
bank goals are either achieved or thwarted. 28 Disposition requires a
number of complex determinations: 29 the location and amount of land
to be transferred; the interest to be transferred; the time of the trans-
fer; the price; the uses to be prescribed or prohibited; the method of
assuring use after disposition; and the process by which the transferee
is selected. An individual disposition decision may be objectionable
either because it causes misdevelopment or because it unjustifiably ex-
cludes some group or use.
Misdevelopment occurs when a disposition, or lack of disposition, is
inconsistent with the legitimate legislative objectives of the land bank.30
One source of misdevelopment is official wrongdoing; officials in charge
of land use regulation have been unusually susceptible to graft, conflict
of interest, and political bias because of the large financial interests in-
volved and the broad range of arguably correct decisions.31 Also, in
land banking, developers seeking advantageous dispositions and public
officials seeking personal or political profit may try to influence the tim-
ing and type of dispositions for personal gain. A less venal source of
misdevelopment is disregard for planning considerations. Land use
regulation has often been controlled by nonprofessionals who fail to
consider the complex factors involved in regulation.32 In addition, the
actions of individual decision makers may be swayed by personal in-
clinations in favor of particular land use patterns.
Objections to a disposition may also be based on its exclusionary ef-
27 Id.
28 See M. CLAwsoN, supra note 9, at 360-61; Public Land Banking, supra note 2, at 945.
The experience of land disposition in the federal urban renewal program is instructive.
See U.S. URBAN RENEWAL ADMINISTATION, URBAN RENEWAL MANUAL ch. 14 (1964); Brown-
field & Ecker, The Disposal of Urban Renewal Land and Land Use Planning, 10 WAYNE
L. REv. 681 (1964).
29 See PIEDMONT TIAD COUNCIL OF GOVERNMENTS, LAND BANK HANDBOOK B-7 to B-9
(C. Van Alstyne ed. 1972).
30 Terming this inconsistency "misdevelopment" is not intended to imply that there is
only one pattern of dispositions that will achieve the desired objectives; there are likely to
be several patterns consistent with the statutory goals.
81 AMERICAN SOc'Y OF PLANNING OFmIs, supra note 2, at 45-46; Tent. Draft No. 5,
supra note 3, at 56-57; cf. Ellickson, supra note 3, at 701 n.73.
32 AMERICAN SOC'Y OF PLANNING OFFICIALS, supra note 2, at 38-40; Public Land Banking,,
supra note 2, at 905-06.
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fect.33 The frequent efforts of suburban communities to protect their
"tight little islands" 34 by exclusionary zoning indicates the importance
of this problem.35 The absolute control over development offered by
land banking makes it an ideal tool for various exclusionary purposes.
In a well-functioning system, judicial review will not be the primary
constraint on land bank dispositions; decisions would be influenced
primarily by specific statutory restrictions on dispositions30 and the pro-
cedures required for decision making.37 These controls alone are un-
likely, however, to assure proper disposition of banked land. Experi-
ence has shown that even the most elaborate and carefully planned ad-
ministrative procedures do not prevent improper action.38 In addition,
legislation prescribing all disposition decisions in detail would deprive
the land bank of needed flexibility.39 Judicial review will be needed to
control dispositions that necessarily involve some exercise of discretion
by regulatory officials.
33 Although virtually any group or use may be excluded, exclusion is used here to
refer to restriction of low and moderate income housing, often with racially discriminatory
effect, and to severe limitation of an area's population growth. National Land & Inv. Co.
v. Easttown Township Bd. of Adjustment, 419 Pa. 504, 553, 215 A.2d 597, 612 (1965); Note,
Equal Protection and Exclusionary Zoning, 81 YALE L.J. 61, 62-63 (1971). These restrictions
are the most likely to be in conflict with independent constitutional or statutory policies
and, unlike exclusion of uses such as heavy industry, are likely to have little relation to
the legitimate goals of the land banking system.
34 See Sager, Tight Little Islands: Exclusionary Zoning, Equal Protection, and the
Indigent, 21 STAN. L. REv. 767 (1969).
35 See Sager, Exclusionary Zoning- Constitutional Limitations on the Power of Mu-
nicipalities to Restrict the Use of Land, 1972 LAiN-UsE CONTROLS ANNUAL 153.
36 For example, under the Model Land Development Code land may not be transferred
pursuant to negotiated sales tainted by conflict of interest. Reporters' Draft, supra note 26,
at § 6-407(4). Other restrictions include a maximum period of time for which land may be
held before disposition. P.R. LAws ANN. tit. 23, § 311f(q) (1964).
37 The Model Land Development Code provides a detailed description of decision-
making procedures. The State Land Planning Agency must consent to all dispositions ex-
cept public sales, transfers to government agencies, short-term leases, return of land to
condemnees, and transactions concerning land held beyond the statutory period. Reporters'
Draft, supra note 26, at § 6-401. Specific procedures are mandated for other types of dis-
position. Id. at §§ 6-402 to -407. The most detailed provisions apply to disposition by
negotiated purchase, because this area is subject to the greatest abuse. Id. at § 6-407. After
the State Land Reserve Agency negotiates with the proposed purchaser, the State Land
Planning Agency holds a public hearing on all matters concerning the sale. The State
Land Planning Agency approves the sale only if it finds the terms fair and in accordance
with the development plan. Id.
38 For a discussion of the role of judicial review of actions in the administrative process,
see L. JAFFE, supra note 5, at 320-27 (1965). The multitude of cases finding improper zon-
ing decisions that were made in an elaborate procedural framework testify to the need for
judicial scrutiny. E.g., Raabe v. City of Walker, 383 Mich. 165, 174 N.W.2d 789 (1970);
Bosse v. City of Portsmouth, 226 A.2d 99 (N.H. 1967). The procedural framework of zon-
ing is discussed in 1 R. ANDERSON, AMmucAN LAW OF ZONING ch. 4 (1968).
39 The validity of this position has been recognized in existing land bank statutes. See,
e.g., P.R. LAws ANN. tit. 23, § 311f (1964).
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The right to challenge a land disposition may be defined in the land
bank enabling statute.40 In the absence of such a provision, the state
statute or case law regulating review of administrative actions will
prevail. 41 The same parties are likely to be permitted to bring suit
under either formulation 4 2 but an affirmative provision in the enabling
statute may eliminate needless confusion.
Although constitutional limitations on land bank dispositions are in-
adequate, 43 the courts have a number of possible models to draw on in
determining the proper standard for nonconstitutional review of dis-
positions. For example, the courts could adopt either a substitution of
judgment test or a standard involving deference to the disposition de-
cision. Consideration of the nature of the development plan and dis-
position decisions44 and analogy to courts' review of zoning decisions45
suggest the appropriate standard of review.
II. THE INADEQUACY OF CONSTITUTIONAL RESTRAINTS
ON LAND BANK DISPOSITIONS
The United States Constitution and most state constitutions impose
some restraints on land bank dispositions.40 The major constitutional
limitations on dispositions depend to some extent on the method of
government acquisition of the land being disposed of. Land may be
40 Tent. Draft No. 3, supra note 3, at § 9-103 suggests that a challenge to a disposition
may be brought by any party to the hearing on the disposition before the land bank
agency or by a party with significant interest that has been injured and that was not
adequately represented in the administrative proceeding. Section 2-304(5) allows estab-
lished community organizations and others with significant interests to participate in the
hearings and thereby in a subsequent court proceeding.
41 In some states, this will require an express reference to the state administrative pro-
cedure law in the land bank statute. E.g., ILL. REv. STAT. ch. 110, § 265 (1971). In others,
the land bank as a state agency will automatically be subject to the provisions for review.
E.g., PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 71, §§ 1710.2, 1710A1 (Purdon's 1962).
42 The Code's provision includes only one class whose standing would otherwise be
questionable, community organizations. Recent exclusionary zoning trends indicate a
judicial tendency to grant these groups standing. Elias, Significant Developments and
Trends in Zoning Litigation, 1973 INSrrruTE ON PLANNING, ZONING, & EMINENT DOMAIN 1.
The Code's catch-all provision, granting standing to those parties with significant un-
represented interests that have been injured, is similar to the Model State Administrative
Procedure Act's standing principle. MODEL STATE ADMINISTRATIVE PROCEDURE ACr § 15(a)
(1970).
43 See text and notes at notes 46-61 infra.
44 See text and notes at notes 65-73 infra.
45 See text and notes at notes 74-146 infra.
46 This discussion deals only with the constitutional restrictions on land disposition.
Other constitutional issues, such as the power of the legislature to delegate authority to
the land bank, can arise. Nothing in the resolution of such issues is unique to land bank-
ing, so they are not considered here. Constitutional issues that might arise because of
specific types of disposition are discussed at text and notes at notes 60-61 infra.
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acquired in two ways: by condemnation or by purchase that is volun-
tary on the part of the seller.47
Federal and state constitutions impose particular limitations on the
disposition of land acquired through the exercise of eminent domain.48
Judicial interpretations of these restrictions, however, have resulted in
a broad scope of permissible dispositions.49 The basic constitutional lim-
itation on the power of a sovereign to condemn land is that the land
must be taken for a public use or public purpose 0° This restraint lim-
its disposition because land may not be condemned under the guise
of a public purpose and then disposed of for a private use. An acceptable
public use, as currently defined, must serve a legitimate governmental
objective and be a reasonable means to achieve that objective.51 Courts
give great deference to legislative definitions of public purposes and
reasonable means to achieve those purposes. 52 In land banking the
legislative goals stated above are certainly legitimate public objectives,
and individual dispositions are likely to be held reasonable means of
serving those objectives. 3 Constitutional restrictions on the eminent
47 See text and notes at notes 9-11 supra. It is not clear at present to what extent each
method of acquisition will be used. Eminent domain may be necessary only to acquire the
last parcel of land from a holdout owner seeking to extort a high price from the govern-
ment. The threat of condemnation and the lower price it usually brings may be enough
to force most owners to sell voluntarily. The type of acquisition may depend on whether
the land bank acquires the land secretly through agents or after an open announcement
of purpose; the latter course of action might tend to elevate the price.
48 Missouri Pac. Ry. v. Nebraska, 164 U.S. 403 (1896); Nichols, The Meaning of Public
Use in Eminent Domain, 20 B.U.L. REv. 615 (1940).
49 F. BOSSELMAN, D. GALLms, & J. BANTA, TnE TAxrNG IssUE (1973); Sax, Takings, Private
Property and Public Interests, 81 YALE L.J. 149 (1971); Comment, The Public Use Doctrine:
"Advance Requiem" Revisited, 1969 LAw & Soc. OaER 688.
50 Berman v. Parker, 348 U.S. 26 (1954); Missouri Pac. Ry. v. Nebraska, 164 U.S. 403
(1896); 1 J. LEwis, EMINENT DoMAiN § 250 (3d ed. 1909).
51 See Berman v. Parker, 348 U.S. 26, 31-34 (1954).
52 Subject to specific constitutional limitations, when the legislature has spoken, the
public interest has been declared in terms well-nigh conclusive. In such cases the
legislature, not the judiciary, is the main guardian of the public needs to be served
by social legislation, whether it be Congress legislating concerning the District of
Columbia or the States legislating concerning local affairs. This principle admits of
no exception merely because the power of eminent domain is involved. The role of
the judiciary in determining whether that power is being exercised for a public pur-
pose is an extremely narrow one.
Id. at 32.
53 The Puerto Rico land banking system was upheld on this basis in Commonwealth v.
Rosso, 95 P.R.R. 488 (1967):
Once there has been a legislative declaration or declaration by the delegated entity
that there is a public utility, within the present meaning of the concept, the courts
cannot intervene with the manner and the means which the legislature or its delegated
entitites choose to exercise the power of condemnation, nor with the selection made
respecting what properties are to be condemned.
Id. at 524.
The level of reasonable relation that must be established here is considerably lower than
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domain power will thus invalidate only the most flagrant misuses of
condemned land.
However land is acquired, land banking is subject to a constitutional
limitation because it is an exercise of the police power.54 The principal
limitation on that power requires that it be exercised reasonably55 and
for the public welfare. 6 The public welfare restriction, like the public
purpose requirement applied to land obtained by eminent domain, is
generally easily satisfied. 57 Similarly, the reasonableness test, like the
reasonable means test applied to land obtained by eminent domain,
usually will not be a significant restriction."s The reasonableness test,
however, is more strictly applied where dispositions achieve the ex-
clusion of certain racial or economic groups from a region. The exer-
cise of the police power in such a discriminatory manner has been held
to be a denial of due process in zoning cases,59 and discrimination in
disposition by the land bank is also proscribed.
Land banking is also subject to restrictions imposed by the equal pro-
tection clause of the fourteenth amendment to the Constitution. Chal-
lenges will probably arise when dispositions allegedly discriminate un-
lawfully against economic groups.6 0 All dispositions that establish prices
for land and subsequent uses discriminate to some extent, but the point
at which discrimination becomes constitutionally impermissible is dif-
ficult to determine 0 ' Full discussion of this issue is beyond the scope of
that embodied in the "fairly debatable" standard used for review of the relation of land
dispositions to statutory objectives. See text and notes at notes 90-91 infra.
54 [Tihe States have full power to regulate within their limits matters of internal
police, including in that general designation whatever will promote the peace, comfort,
convenience, and prosperity of their people." Escanaba Co. v. Chicago, 107 U.S. 678, 683
(1882).
55 Goldblatt v. Town of Hempstead, 369 U.S. 590, 594-95 (1962); Lawton v. Steele, 152
U.S. 133, 137 (1894).
56 Chicago & Alton R.R. v. Tranbarger, 238 U.S. 67, 76-77 (1915).
57 See Queenside Hills Realty Co. v. Saxl, 328 U.S. 80, 83 (1946); Galvan v. Superior
Court, 70 Cal. 2d 851, 869, 452 P.2d 930, 942, 76 Cal. Rptr. 642, 654 (1969).
58 See, e.g., Sproles v. Binford, 286 U.S. 374, 388-89 (1932).
59 In re Kit-Mar Builders, 439 Pa. 466, 268 A.2d 765 (1970); National Land & Inv. Co.
v. Easttown Township Bd. of Adjustment, 419 Pa. 504, 215 A.2d 597 (1965).
60 Cf. Kennedy Park Homes Ass'n v. City of Lackawanna, 318 F. Supp. 669 (W.D.N.Y.),
aff'd, 436 F.2d 108 (2d Cir. 1970), cert. denied, 401 U.S. 1010 (1971); Dailey v. City of Law-
ton, 296 F. Supp. 266 (W.D. Okla. 1969), aff'd, 425 F.2d 1037 (10th Cir. 1970).
61 A complicating factor is that the test for denial of equal protection is presently un-
clear. See generally San Antonio Ind. School Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1 (1973) (opinion
of the Court by Powell, J.); id. at 70 (Marshall, J. dissenting); Gunther, The Supreme
Court, 1971 Term-Foreword: In Search of Evolving Doctrine on a Changing Court: A
Model for a Newer Equal Protection, 86 HARv. L. Rav. 1 (1972). Under the traditional test,
those alleging unconstitutionality would have to establish that there was no rational rela-
tion between the purposes of land banking and the disposition or that the disposition was
grounded on a suspect classification or infringed fundamental personal rights. Develop-
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this comment; it is sufficient to note that only in extreme cases will dis-
positions be subject to invalidation as denying equal protection to cer-
tain economic groups.
The ease with which the constitutional requirements on land bank-
ing are met suggests that they do not provide adequate protection
against misuse of land banking authority.
III. NONCONSTITUTIONAL REvIEW OF MISDEVELOPMENT
The basic nonconstitutional limitation on the disposition of banked
land is that the disposition be within the statutory authorization. 2
Dispositions will be authorized only if they further the statutory ob-
jectives of the system. The purpose of this section is to define a tech-
nique of judicial review by which a court may determine whether a
particular disposition complies with the statutory objectives.
A. Judicial Review Under the Development Plan
The purpose of the land bank development plan is to achieve in the
specific area to be developed6 3 the general objectives outlined in
enabling legislation. Many land dispositions will be either directed by
or in conflict with the plan, 4 and the plan will provide some indication
of whether a challenged disposition is consistent with the statutory ob-
jectives. To determine the weight to be given the plan, it is necessary
to determine whether it should be classified as a legislative rule that
defines the objectives or an interpretative rule that does not have the
force of law."5
The plan will usually not be a legislative rule.60 An agency may issue
ments in the Law - Equal Protection, 82 HAnv. L. REv. 1065 (1969). The land bank would
generally be able to satisfy the rational relation test. Recent decisions discussing wealth
and race as suspect classifications and housing as a fundamental interest cast doubt on
the likelihood of finding a denial of equal protection in any but extreme cases. See San
Antonio Ind. School Dist. v. Rodriguez, supra; Jefferson v. Hackney, 406 U.S. 535 (1972);
Lindsey v. Normet, 405 U.S. 56 (1972); James v. Valtierra, 402 U.S. 137 (1971); Dandridge
v. Williams, 397 U.S. 471 (1970). See-Comment, Equal Protection and Exclusionary Zoning,
81 YALE L.J. 61 (1971). In the land bank case there will frequently not even be a definable
class that has been singled out for discrimination. See id. at 77. Where equal protection
review is ineffective, the antipresumption review technique may be used to prevent im-
proper dispositions. See text and notes at notes 127-46 infra.
62 See text and notes at notes 86-88 infra.
63 See text and notes at notes 17-18 supra.
64 But see text at note 100 infra.
65 See Gibson Wine Co. v. Snyder, 194 F.2d 329, 331-32 (D.C. Cir. 1952); Comptroller
of the Treasury v. M.E. Rockhill, Inc., 205 Md. 226, 234, 107 A.2d 93, 98 (1954); 1
K. DAvis, ADMINISTRATr E LAw TR A'rm § 5.03 (1958).
66 If the development plan were characterized as a legislative rule, there would be a
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a legislative rule only if there is a grant of authority by the legislature to
the agency to make rules having the force of law,67 and land bank stat-
utes generally do not grant such authority. 8 In the typical case, the de-
velopment plan must therefore be treated as an interpretative rule. The
issue for the courts is then the extent to which they should accept the
specific requirements of the plan as an expression of the statutory
objectives.
Two factors inherent in the development plan suggest that the court
should give it substantial weight in reviewing a specific disposition.
First, courts have generally recognized that they must refrain from sub-
stitution of judgment in matters of agency expertise. 69 The creation of
a development plan that will achieve the statutory objectives requires
both technical expertise and an understanding of the competing public
interests that will be affected,70 and it will generally be beyond the
competence of a court to evaluate such a plan.7 1
The second factor suggesting that judicial deference is appropriate
is thoroughness in the consideration and adoption of the plan.72 The
formulation of the plan is preceded by a comprehensive study of the
current and future needs and conditions of the area. The plan is con-
limited scope of review: whether the rule is within the power of the agency, is reasonable,
and was issued by proper procedure. 1 K. DAvis, supra note 65, at § 5.05; cf. In re Da-
Lomba's Case, 352 Mass. 598, 603, 227 N.E.2d 513, 517 (1967).
67 1 K. DAvis, supra note 65, at § 5.05.
08 Some land bank statutes, for example those of Kentucky and Puerto Rico, contain
no provision at all for the making of a development plan. Others authorize planning in
language that makes the effect of the plan unclear. The Ohio statute, for example, em-
powers the agency to "[e]ngage in planning for the new community district, and prepare
or approve a development plan therefore, and engage in land acquisitions and land
development in accordance with such plan or plans," OHIo REv. CODE ANN. § 349.06(0)
(Page Supp. 1973), but also authorizes the agency to acquire and dispose of land "on such
terms and in such manner as it considers proper." Id. § 349.06(A) & (B). It is probably
undesirable to give the plan the force of law in reviewing dispositions; no planning docu-
ment should be enshrined as a legislative plan, because development planning for the
land bank is an ongoing process. See text and notes at notes 17-18 supra. Treating the plan
as an interpretative rule gives weight to planning in review of dispositions but does not
preclude flexibility. See generally F. CHAPIN, URBAN LAND UsE PLANNING (1965).
If the development plan were characterized as legislative, dispositions would still ulti-
mately be judged against the legislative objectives. A legislative rule must be within the
authority of the agency, so a plan that did not accord with the objectives would be of
no weight either in support of or in opposition to a disposition. Commonwealth v. Di-
Meglio, 385 Pa. 119, 122 A.2d 77 (1956).
69 E.g., Langen v. Badlands-Co-operative State Grazing Dist., 125 Mont. 302, 309, 234
P.2d 467, 471 (1951). Where the technical nature of the matter requires uniformity of
policy there is an additional measure of hesitance. Id. This factor obviously applies to a
development plan, where regional uniformity is mandatory.
70 See F. CHAPIN, supra note 68, at 7-68.
71 Cf. LA. REv. STAT. ANN. § 7603(15); Tent. Draft No. 3, supra note 3, at § 8-402.
72 Cf. Skidmore v. Swift & Co., 323 U.S. 134, 140 (1944).
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structed only after consideration of all relevant information. Adoption
of a development plan will usually require compliance with elaborate
administrative procedures, including public distribution, hearings, op-
portunity for public comment, and review by higher authorities. 73
These procedures give the plan many of the attributes of a legislative
rule and suggest that it should be accorded substantial deference.
An examination of the principles applied in zoning law also indicates
that the development plan should be given great weight in review of
dispositions. This examination is appropriate because of the parallels
between the land bank development plan and the zoning ordinance.
In both zoning and land banking a general scheme for land use con-
tro174 is adopted through a legislative-type process 75 pursuant to a legis-
lative grant of authority76 in furtherance of certain public objectives. 77
Actions may be taken under the guidance of the general scheme78 or as
a change in policy; 79 the general plan is not strictly binding.80 Chal-
lenges to specific actions must allege that there is deviation from the
78 See, e.g., Tent. Draft No. 3, supra note 3, at § 8-405.
74 A key purpose of land banking is control of land development in a rational way
through a general plan. See text and note at note 12 supra. The Standard State Zoning
Enabling Act requires that zoning be done "in accordance with a comprehensive plan;"
the enabling legislation of forty-four states includes that or a similar provision. 1 R. AN-
DERSON, supra note 38, at § 5.02.
75 The procedure for adopting a land bank development plan is discussed in text and
notes at notes 72-73 supra. The adoption of a zoning ordinance is always a legislative act.
See, e.g., Orth v. Board of County Comm'rs, 158 Colo. 540, 545, 408 P.2d 974, 977 (1965).
76 For a discussion of the agencies to which land banking powers can be delegated and
their authority, see text and notes at notes 9-11 supra. Every state legislature has dele-
gated the power to zone to municipal governments. 1 R. ANDERSON, supra note 38, at
§ 3.09. There has been little dispute over the legitimacy of this delegation. See, e.g., In
re Opinion of the Justices, 124 Me. 501, 509, 128 A. 181, 185 (1925).
77 The zoning power is exercised, in general terms, for the public welfare. Gibbons &
Reed Co. v. North Salt Lake City, 19 Utah 2d 329, 332, 431 P.2d 559, 562 (1967). The land
bank objectives are discussed at notes 12-16 supra, and their implications at notes 17-18
supra. While these objectives are not as broad as the "public welfare," they are usually
phrased in language broad enough to approach that concept. E.g., Statement of Motives,
P.R. Acts, May 16, 1962, No. 3.
78 The land bank development plan may direct a disposition pattern. In zoning cases,
amendments have been upheld where they were enacted pursuant to the community's com-
prehensive plan. Malafronte v. Planning and Zoning Bd., 155 Conn. 205, 230 A.2d 606
(1967).
79 Changed conditions may require an alteration of the land bank's policy. This policy
is as valid here as in the case of a zoning amendment: "There can be no question but that
the municipality has the right to amend its zoning ordinance from time to time as new
and changing conditions warrant and require such revision.... To hold otherwise would
be to fix cities' development in the mould of the first zoning ordinances enacted." Jardine
v. City of Pasadena, 199 Cal. 64, 76, 248 P. 225, 229 (1926).
80 The land bank agency is usually not authorized by statute to create a binding plan.
See text and notes at notes 66-68 supra. As discussed in note 79 supra, the comprehensive
zoning plan may be amended as required.
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general plan in a manner that conflicts with the legitimate objectives
of the activity.8'
Early zoning cases, because of the merely semi-official status of master
plans 2 and a general judicial distrust of planning,8 3 gave master zoning
plans little weight. As a practical matter, this result was appropriate; in
the early period of zoning, many zoning governments were without
professional planning expertise.8 4 As such expertise has become more
readily available, however, plans have been given greater weight in
reviewing zoning actions.8 5
A zoning ordinance is normally presumed to be a valid exercise of the
authority delegated to the zoning government. 6 The general principle
is that an ordinance will not be invalidated so long as it is within the
realm of fair debate that the ordinance reasonably serves the objectives
of zoning.8 7 This principle is derived from the basic concept that, within
constitutional limits, the determination of questions of land control
policy is properly for the legislature and the authorities to which the
questions are delegated, not for the courts.88 A court reviewing a land
bank disposition should likewise respect the legislative delegation of
the responsibility to determine development policy. After it has been
determined that the plan is to be given significant weight in a deter-
mination of the specific objectives of the system, it is necessary to exam-
ine the precise way in which the courts should undertake review of
specific dispositions.
I. Dispositions Directed by the Development Plan. Land disposi-
tions, like other exercises of the police power, should initially be pre-
sumed to be in furtherance of legitimate statutory policies.8 9 The plain-
tiff attacking a disposition will then bear the burden of persuading the
81 As to land banking, see text and notes at notes 30-2 supra. The allegation in a
spot zoning case is that the government has singled out the property of an individual for
special benefit in derogation of the general zoning scheme and the public welfare. Rodgers
v. Village of Tarrytown, 302 N.Y. 115, 123, 96 N.E.2d 731, 734 (1951).
82 Cf. D. HAGMAN, URBAN PLANNING AND LAND DEVELOPMENT CONTROL LAw § 12 (1971).
83 See, e.g., Lordship Park Ass'n v. Board of Zoning Appeals, 137 Conn. 84, 75 A.2d 379
(1950).
84 Haar, "In Accordance With a Comprehensive Plan," 68 HAxv. L. Ra,. 1154, 1170-
73 (1955).
85 E.g., Aspen Hill Venture v. Montgomery County Council, 265 Md. 303, 314-15, 289
A.2d 303, 309 (1972).
86 See, e.g., Levitt v. Sands Point, 6 N.Y.2d 269, 160 N.E.2d 501, 189 N.Y.S.2d 212 (1959).
87 See, e.g., Stevens v. Huntington, 20 N.Y.2d 352, 355, 229 N.E.2d 591, 593 283 N.Y.S.2d
16, 18, (1967). See generally 1 R. ANDERSON, supra note 38, at § 2.16. Other principles are
discussed id. §§ 2.17-2.18.
88 Cf. Village of Euclid v. Ambler Realty Co., 272 U.S. 365, 388 (1926).
89 Cf. State v. Grant, 107 N.H. 1, 3, 216 A.2d 790, 791 (1966); State v. Hudson House,
Inc., 231 Ore. 164, 171, 371 P.2d 675, 679 (1962).
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court that the disposition is not within the prescribed aims of land bank-
ing.9 0 The land bank will be able to support the validity of the disposi-
tion by showing that it is directed by the development plan. The plan
provides substantial evidence of the validity of the disposition within
the legislative policy. 9' The plaintiff may rebut the effect of the plan
by showing that the development plan, or at least the portion of it re-
lating to the disposition in question, does not in fact accord with the
legislative objectives.9 2 Attacking the plan itself, however, is a much
heavier burden for the plaintiff to meet than simply demonstrating
that a particular disposition is not within the statutory objectives . 3
The plan thus increases significantly the plaintiff's burden where the
particular disposition is directed by the plan.
2. Dispositions Inconsistent with the Development Plan. One doc-
trine employed in spot zoning cases-the change or mistake rule-
places primary importance on the comprehensive plan94 in defining the
validity of an amendment to the zoning ordinance, but still allows some
flexibility. A municipal zoning body may amend its zoning ordinance
on a showing of a mistake in the original enactment of the ordinance
or changed conditions in the area.95 The rationale for the change or
mistake rule is that a decision concerning a proper use of land that is
inconsistent with the determination embodied in the orignal ordinance
is inherently suspect.9" The party favoring the amendment bears the
burden of showing the existence of a change or mistake sufficient to
justify such an inconsistency.
A similar doctrine is appropriate in the case of an attack on a disposi-
tion inconsistent with the development plan. The challenger would
bear the initial burden of showing a conflict between-the disposition
and the plan. The burden then shifts to the land bank to establish that
90 See text and notes at notes 86-88 supra.
91 See text and notes at notes 63-85 supra.
92 For example, a plan that originally served the legislative policy may be shown to
no longer do so because of changed circumstances.
93 See text and notes at notes 63-85 supra.
94 The comprehensive plan here need not be the formal master plan; it may be the
court's view of the general plan contained in the zoning ordinance. See MacDonald v.
Board of County Comm'rs, 238 Md. 549, 555, 210 A.2d 325, 328 (1965).
95 The change or mistake rule has had its greatest impact in Maryland. See, e.g., id.;
1 R. ANDERSON, supra note 38, at § 4.29. Under the Maryland rule supporters of the zoning
amendment must establish (1) what area reasonably constitutes the "neighborhood" of
the property affected; (2) the changes that have occurred; and (3) that these changes have
significantly altered the character of the neighborhood. Montgomery v. Board of County
Comm'rs, 256 Md. 597, 602, 261 A.2d 447, 450 (1970), rev'd on appeal from remand, 263
Md. 1, 280 A.2d 901 (1971).
96 See Whittle v. Board of Zoning Appeals, 211 Md. 36, 45, 125 A.2d 41, 46 (1956).
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the particular disposition complies with the statutory objectives de-
spite conflict with the development plan. Although there are likely to
be several possible dispositions that comply with the statutory objec-
tives, the change or mistake doctrine presumes that the plan expresses
the disposition pattern that most fully complies with the statute and
requires that changed circumstances97 or the need to correct a mistake98
justify any inconsistencies between the disposition and the plan. Appli-
cation of this doctrine would limit ill-considered or improperly mo-
tivated dispositions and would encourage the land bank to engage in
continuing planning, with periodic revisions of the plan as condi-
tions change. 99
B. Judicial Review of Discretionary Dispositions
In practice, few cases will involve dispositions that clearly are directed
by or in conflict with the development plan. Many parts of the plan will
define only general goals, or provide a number of options, thus leaving
the land bank with considerable discretion over particular dispositions.
In these cases, the courts should draw on review techniques developed
in spot zoning cases.
Spot zoning involves amendments to a general zoning ordinance that
affect small parcels of land. An amendment may represent either a
change in policy due to changed circumstances in the community0 0 or
the first time a land use policy is affirmatively applied to a tract.1 10 The
latter is often the case where land in a developing area is changed from
an agricultural or other holding classification to a developable cate-
gory,10 2 similar to the land bank's disposition of land formerly in a hold-
ing zone.
A spot zoning amendment is always a legislative act. 03 A particular
land bank disposition may be legislative or administrative, depending
on the form of the land bank agency. The definition of general disposi-
tion patterns will nearly always be legislative in nature,104 but particular
dispositions not prescribed in the plan may be ordered by agency offi-
97 E.g., Montgomery v. Board of County Comm'rs, 263 Md. 1,280 A.2d 901 (1971).
98 E.g., Overton v. Board of County Comm'rs, 225 Md. 212, 170 A.2d 172 (1961).
99 Such periodic revision must adhere to the standards set for the adoption of the
original plan. See text and notes at notes 72-73 supra; cf. Dalton v. Honolulu, 51 HAw.
400,462 P.2d 199 (1969).
100 E.g., Thomas v. Town of Bedford, 11 N.Y.2d 428, 184 N.E.2d 285, 230 N.Y.S.2d 684
(1962).
101 E.g., McQuail v. Shell Oil Co., 40 Del. Ch. 396, 183 A.2d 572 (Sup. Ct. 1962).
102 Id.
103 Fusco v. Town of Oyster Bay, 23 Misc. 2d 72, 74, 200 N.Y.S.2d 567, 570 (Sup. Ct.
1960).
104 A legislative act of the land bank agency, however, rather than of the state legislature.
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cials. Even where the disposition decision is made by an official, how-
ever, it will have a legislative-type purpose-the achievement of gen-
eral public objectives-rather than the administrative-type purpose of
alleviation of special hardship on individuals, as is the case, for example,
with zoning variances. 1°5
The general test used by courts in reviewing spot zoning amendments
is whether it is fairly debatable that the amendment is related to the
general welfare.10 In applying this test, the courts generally impose
three requirements that are particularly useful in review of land bank
dispositions. First, there must be substantial evidence that the action
is reasonable.10 7 Second, the way in which the determination is made
must be indicative of a reasoned decision.108 Third, the action must not
be solely for the benefit of an individual or small group.10 9
1. Substantial Evidence of Reasonableness. Under the first test for
spot zoning, there must be substantial evidence that the amendment is
a reasonable exercise of the police power. 110 Many factors are considered
relevant to this determination.'". Often mentioned are the density and
nature of surrounding land,112 the relation between the amended use
and surrounding uses,113 the needs of the area,114 the availability of
public services,115 and the effect of the change in use on the value of
neighboring property.11"
In the case of land banking it is similarly appropriate to require sub-
stantial evidence of compliance with statutory objectives. Because the
land involved will usually be less developed than in zoning cases, differ-
ent factors will be relevant. The needs or the region for the use pre-
105 An analogy to variances or special exceptions, for example, would be improper
because these techniques provide relief from zoning restrictions that impose unusual prac-
tical difficulties and unnecessary hardships on a landowner. Sinclair Pipe Line Co. v.
Village of Richton Park, 19 II. 2d 870, 373, 167 N.E.2d 406, 408 (1960). By their very
nature variances are inconsistent with the planned control of land; they are tolerated in
zoning because of the unusual personal hardship imposed, but are unnecessary in land
banking.
100 See text and note at note 87 supra.
107 See text and notes at notes 110-116 infra.
108 See text and notes at notes 117-122 infra.
109 See text and notes 128-126 infra.
110 Eckes v. Board of Zoning Appeals, 209 Md. 482, 121 A.2d 249 (1956); Rodgers v.
Village of Tarrytown, 302 N.Y. 115, 96 N.E.2d 781 (1951).
111 See generally 1 R. AnnERsON, supra note 88, at § 5.05.
112 Malafronte v. Planning and Zoning Bd., 155 Conn. 205, 211, 230 A.2d 606, 610 (1967).
113 Buell v. City of Bremerton, 80 Wash. 2d 518, 526, 495 P.2d 1858, 1363 (1972).
114 Durand v. Superintendent of Public Bldgs., 354 Mass. 74, 75, 285 N.E.2d 550, 552
(1968).
115 De Meo v. Zoning Comm'n, 148 Conn. 68, 167 A.2d 454, 457 (1961).
116 Willott v. Village of Beachwood, 175 Ohio St. 557, 559, 197 N.E.2d 201, 204 (1964).
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scribed in the disposition, the availability of alternative parcels, and the
relation of the disposition to other proposed or actual uses in the area
are likely to be particularly significant considerations.
2. Procedural History of the Disposition Decision. As professional
planning expertise has become available to zoning governments, courts
have increasingly recognized its usefulness in the making of zoning
decisions. 17 A zoning amendment is more likely to be upheld if it is
based on a history of serious consideration and consultation among the
governing authorities, professional planners, and the public." 8 Where a
decision is made abruptly and without consultation or procedural safe-
guards, however, courts are more likely to find the amendment arbitrary
and therefore invalid."19
In land bank cases the procedural history of a disposition decision
should similarly be relevant to the validity of the disposition. Where a
formal decision procedure is prescribed in the enabling statute, the
court should require that it be followed. 20 Where no procedure is man-
dated, the court may require procedures that provide for full consider-
ation and careful action.' 21 Consultation with expert planners, oppor-
tunity for inputs by concerned groups, and findings and reasons would
be relevant procedural steps.122
3. Apparent Benefit. In reviewing zoning amendments, courts have
considered whether an amendment is invalid because made for private
rather than public benefit. 23 The basic inquiry is whether the action
serves no general public purpose, but instead singles out one party for
special benefit.124 The subjective motives of zoning officials are irrele-
vant,125 but a clear showing of apparent impropriety is sufficient to in-
validate an amendment. If, in viewing all the evidence relating to a
zoning amendment, the court finds more than incidental benefit to the
property owner involved, a finding of invalidity may be appropriate.126
117 See, e.g., Albright v. Town of Manlius, 28 N.Y.2d 108, 268 N.E. 2d 785, 320 N.Y.S.2d.
50 (1971). See generally 1 R. ANDERSON, supra note 38, at § 5.13.
118 E.g., West Ridge, Inc. v. McNamara, 222 Md. 448, 160 A.2d 907 (1960); Twenty-One
White Plains Corp. v. Village of Hastings-on-Hudson, 14 Misc. 2d 800, 180 N.Y.S.2d 13
(Sup. Ct. 1958), aff'd, 9 App. Div. 2d 934, 196 N.Y.S.2d 562 (1959).
119 E.g., Smith v. Skagit County, 75 Wash. 2d 715, 453 P-2d 832 (1969).
120 See, e.g., Reporters' Draft, supra note 26, at §§ 6-403, 6-406.
121 For example, the Model Land Development Code gives the State Land Reserve
Agency considerable discretion in making negotiated dispositions. Reporters' Draft, supra
note 26, at § 6-407. The court can require that this discretion be structured and confined.
See K. DAVIS, ADxuNSTRATIvE LAW: CAsEs-TExT-PRoBLEMs 448 (1973).
122 See generally id. at 520-24.
123 See generally 1 R. ANDERsON, supra note 38, at § 5.05.
124 Kuehne v. Town Council, 136 Conn. 452, 460, 72 A.2d 474,478 (1950).
125 Strandberg v. Kansas City, 415 S.W.2d 737, 742 (Mo. 1967).
126 Vece v. Zoning and Planning Comm'n, 148 Conn. 500, 172 A.2d 619, 621 (1961). For
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Since land banking is designed to achieve public goals, a disposition
primarily made for private benefit should similarly be invalidated.
Incidental benefit to the land transferee is not decisive; a disposition
is not automatically outside the legitimate aims of the land bank merely
because a developer profits from it. Where there is clear evidence, how-
ever, that the disposition favors the developer in derogation of the legis-
lative policy, the court may properly hold the disposition invalid.
Judicial review of a discretionary disposition should not involve as-
sessment of the correctness of the decision as part of the development
policy, but the courts should determine whether a disposition is reason-
ably related to the statutory objectives of the land bank. An examina-
tion of the nature of the evidence supporting the disposition, the way in
which it was made, and the apparent motive for the disposition will
provide adequate review of discretionary dispositions without usurping
the land bank's authority.
IV. JUDICIAL REVIEW OF EXCLUSIONARY DIsPosrrIONS
The judicial review procedures described in the previous sections are
designed to prevent dispositions of banked land in conflict with the
statutory objectives of the land bank. A broader problem arises when
the land bank engages in a pattern of dispositions that does not directly
conflict with the enabling statute, but instead excludes or severely limits
uses favored by other state policies. A limited number of exclusionary
patterns may be forbidden by the state or federal constitutions, for ex-
ample, where exclusion of low-income housing creates a racially dis-
criminatory pattern. 127 Many exclusions or limitations, however, will
restrict uses such as trailer parks, moderate income housing units,
or schools; these uses may be favored by state policies, but they are not
constitutionally protected. Exclusion of these uses could be con-
sistent with the enabling statute and directed by the development
plan. Under the tests designed for review of misdevelopment, such
exclusions would often be found valid. Other principles of review, how-
ever, indicate that such exclusionary patterns may be invalidated. 128
Again, zoning law provides a useful analogy. A general principle of
zoning review, recently used in exclusionary zoning cases, is known as
the antipresumption.12 9 Where a local zoning action conflicts with a
an extreme case, see Blumberg v. City of Yonkers, 21 App. Div. 2d 886, 251 N.Y.S.2d 750
(1964), af'd, 15 N.Y.2d 791,205 N.E.2d 686, 257 N.Y.S.2d 589 (1965).
127 See, e.g., Kennedy Park Homes Ass'n v. City of Lackawanna, 318 F. Supp. 669
(W.D.N.Y.), aff'd, 436 F.2d 108 (2d Cir. 1970), cert. denied, 401 U.S. 1010 (1971); Dailey v.
City of Lawton, 296 F. Supp. 266 (W.D. Okla. 1969), afJ'd, 425 F.2d 1037 (10th Cir. 1970).
128 See text and notes at notes 129-46 infra.
129 The designation "antipresumption" was applied in Feiler, Metropolitanization and
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state policy favoring a particular use, the antipresumption imposes on
the local body the burden of justifying its action. The antipresumption
is used to deal with exclusion of favored uses such as schools, 130 hos-
pitals,11 1 and public utilities.182 Where such uses are excluded, the anti-
presumption provides legal recognition of the fact that the conflict is
between state and local policies, not between an individual's needs and
the local government's policies. 33
To bring the antipresumption into effect, the plaintiff challenging
a use restriction must show that there is a general exclusion of that use
and that the excluded use is favored by a state public policy.134 State
policy may be expressed in state constitutional provisions, statutes, or
judicial precedents. 135 The use must be totally excluded or allowed
only in minimal quantities that are equivalent to exclusion. 136 When a
restriction is shown to be exclusionary in violation of a state policy, the
action loses its normal presumption of validity, and the burden is
shifted to the municipality to demonstrate a substantial relationship
between the restriction and the local public welfare. 3
7
The leading case on the antipresumption as applied to exclusionary
zoning is Bristow v. City of Woodhaven,13 in which the plaintiff owned
Land-Use Parochialism-Toward a Judicial Attitude, 69 MICH. L. REV. 655 (1971), cited in
Bristow v. City of Woodhaven, 35 Mich. App. 205, 211, 192 N.W.2d 322, 325 (1971). Cf. 9
J. WIGMORE, EVIDENCE § 2493 (3d ed. 1940).
130 Diocese of Rochester v. Planning Bd., I N.Y.2d 508, 136 N.E.2d 827, 154 N.YS.2d
849 (1956).
131 Wilmington v. Turk, 14 Del. Ch. 392, 129 A. 512 (Ch. 1925).
182 Consolidated Edison Co. v. village of Briarcliff Manor, 208 Misc. 295, 144 N.Y.S.2d
379 (Sup. Ct. 1955).
133 The antipresumption in effect reads general state policies into the land bank enab-
ling statute, but allows more flexibility than if such policies were directly and deliberately
incorporated into the statute.
134 Bristow v. City of Woodhaven, 35 Mich. App. 205,211, 192 N.W.2d 322, 325 (1971).
135 See text and notes at notes 141-146 infra.
138 Binkowski v. Township of Shelby, 46 Mich. App. 451, 467, 208 N.W.2d 243, 251
(1973).
137 Id. at 461-62, 208 N.W.2d at 248-49; Congregation Dovid Ben Nuchim v. Oak Park,
40 Mich. App. 698, 700, 199 N.W.2d 557, 559 (1972). The antipresumption cases do not
agree on the burden that is shifted to the municipality. The leading cases in Michigan
and Pennsylvania are unclear on whether a burden of persuasion or a burden of produc-
ing evidence shifts to the government. Bristow v. City of Woodhaven, 35 Mich. App. 205,
192 N.W.2d 322 (1971); Beaver Gasoline Co. v. Osborne Borough, 445 Pa. 571,
285 A.2d 501 (1971). Subsequent cases are divided on the issue. Compare Smookler v.
Township of Wheatfield, 46 Mich. App. 162, 163, 207 N.W.2d 464 (1973), and Sauer v.
Richland Township, 8 Pa. Comm. 464, 467 (Comm. Ct. 1973), with Johnson v. Township
of Lyon, 45 Mich. App. 491, 493, 206 N.W.2d 761, 763 (1973). Shifting the burden of per-
suasion would require the land bank to affirmatively justify its action in opposition to a
state policy and not merely to adduce some evidence in support of its disposition.
138 35 Mich. App. 205, 192 N.W.2d 322 (1971). The Pennsylvania Supreme Court adopted
the antipresumption in Beaver Gasoline Co. v. Osborne Borough, 445 Pa. 571, 285 A.2d
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land that he wished to sell for use as a mobile home park. A city ordi-
nance limited the number of trailers allowed in such a park to seventy-
five, a restriction that made use of the land as a park economically un-
feasible. Plaintiff challenged the refusal of the city to amend the or-
dinance, and the Michigan Court of Appeals affirmed the lower court's
invalidation of the restriction. The use of land for a trailer park was
recognized as legitimate and favored by the state.139 The de facto ex-
clusion of trailer parks by the local government was held to be the
equivalent of a declaration that trailer parks were nuisances and detri-
mental to the general welfare,'4 0 and an antipresumption arose. The city
failed to demonstrate a substantial relationship between the ordinance
and the local public welfare, and the restriction was held invalid.
The Bristow court described the means by which a use achieves fa-
vored or preferred status. First, certain uses are recognized as bearing
such "a real, substantial, and beneficial relationship to the public
health, safety, and welfare"'141 that they are favored by courts.142 In addi-
tion, the state constitution may encourage certain uses143 and state
legislation "which is not merely for licensing or regulatory purposes
but which purports to promote and encourage the good and well being
of the general public" also confers preferred status.'4 Finally, regula-
tion of a use by the state and a critical public need may cause it to be
favored by the courts. 146 This situation existed in Bristow, where mo-
501 (1971). The Michigan courts following Bristow have developed the antipresumption
more extensively than the Pennsylvania courts following Beaver Gasoline. Binkowski v.
Township of Shelby, 46 Mich. App. 451, 208 N.W.2d 243 (1973); Sabo v. Township of
Monroe, 46 Mich. App. 344, 208 N.W.2d 57 (1973); Smookler v. Township of Wheatfield,
46 Mich. App. 162, 207 N.W.2d 464 (1973); Johnson v. Township of Lyon, 45 Mich. App.
491, 206 N.W.2d 761 (1973); George v. Township of Harrison, 44 Mich. App. 357, 205
N.W.2d 254 (1973); Rodd v. Township of Palmyra, 42 Mich. App. 434, 202 N.W.2d 446
(1972); Congregation Dovid Ben Nuchim v. Oak Park, 40 Mich. App. 698, 199 N.W.2d
557 (1972); Green v. Township of Lima, 40 Mich. App. 655, 199 N.W.2d 243 (1972); Cohen
v. Township of Canton, 38 Mich. App. 680, 197 N.W.2d 101 (1972); Simmons v. Royal Oak,
38 Mich. App. 496, 196 N.W.2d 811 (1972); Sauer v. Richland Township, 8 Pa. Comm. 464
(Comm. Ct. 1973); Mobil Oil Corp. v. Zoning Bd. of Adjustment, 5 Pa. Comm. 535 (Comm.
Ct. 1972); Shomo v. Derry Borough, 5 Pa. Comm. 216 (Comm. Ct. 1972).
139 35 Mich. App. at 217, 192 N.W.2d at 327.
140 Id. at 215-16, 192 N.W.2d at 326-27.
141 Id. at 210, 192 N.W.2d at 324.
142 Id. at 213, 192 N.W.2d at 326.
143 For example, the provision in the Michigan constitution approving "religion, moral-
ity, and knowledge" lead to a favored status for religious institutions. MicH. CONsT. art. 11,
§ 1; 35 Mich. App. at 212, 192 N.W.2d at 325.
144 35 Mich. App. at 215, 192 N.W.2d at 326, citing Detroit Edison Co. v. City of Wixom,
382 Mich. 673 (1969).
145 Id.
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bile home parks were licensed by the state and a massive housing
shortage created a need for them. 146
The land bank antipresumption should operate in the same manner
as the zoning antipresumption. The challenger would be required first
to demonstrate a state policy favoring, for example, adequate housing.
This policy could be indicated by state programs designed to provide
public housing or to encourage ownership of private housing by lower
and-middle income families. The challenger to the disposition would
then be required to prove actual exclusion of this type of housing from
the land bank area.
After the challenger's prima facie case of exclusion is made, the land
bank must produce evidence supporting the exclusion. It could refute
the charge of exclusionary effect or present evidence supporting an
affirmative case for the necessity for the exclusion. Such evidence could
include, for example, planning considerations that make exclusion de-
sirable, the availability of alternative housing, or a lack of demand for
this type of housing. The court may decide that there is no exclusion,
that the exclusion is reasonable, or that it is unreasonable and a remedy
is required.
The antipresumption thus effectively provides for consideration of
both state policies and local needs. The existence of this type of review
will also encourage land bank officials to give consideration to broader
state policies in making disposition decisions.
CONCLUSION
Land banking, although not a new technique, is increasingly being
advanced as a solution to urban land use problems. The disposition
of banked land is a key step in the land banking process. This comment
suggests that the major problems in land disposition, misdevelopment
and exclusion, can be effectively limited by judicial review. The ex-
perience gained in review of zoning actions provides several techniques
for this purpose. Judicial review will also help shape the land banking
process. Review of misdevelopment emphasizes the importance of plan-
ning and adherence to statutory authorization. Review of exclusionary
dispositions points up the greater community of interests to which the
land bank should be responsive. Both stress the importance of relating
the disposition process to the goals that land banking is designed to serve.
Jay M. Feinman
146 The favored state policy need not be respecting housing, but housing is the most
likely policy to arise in the land bank context.
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